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Introduction
What kind of things can feature in cognitive processes?1 The traditional answer is a very 
simple one: cognitive processes take place in the brain; therefore, a process that is 
cognitive is realized intracranially—viz., within the bounds of skull and skin. In short, 
cognitive processes supervene on intracranial biological processes and nothing else.2 
That’s the standard story at any rate, and the inherited approach to mainstream epis-
temological theory has always taken something like this traditional picture of cogni-
tion for granted3 in the course of making epistemic evaluations.
But mainstream epistemology shouldn’t get too comfortable with this background 
picture. The past several decades of work in the philosophy of mind and cognitive 
science have been increasingly receptive to a more radical picture of cognition—one 
that diverges sharply from the traditional view—in the form of active externalism.4 
1 Thanks to Duncan Pritchard, Orestis Palermos, and Andy Clark for helpful discussion. This article was 
written as part of the AHRC-funded “Extended Knowledge” (#AH/J011908/1) research project that is 
hosted by the University of Edinburgh’s Eidyn Research Centre.
2 For a sustained recent defense of this traditional picture of the bounds of cognition, see Adams and 
Aizawa (2008).
3 One simple way to make this point is in terms of competing ways of thinking about epistemic justifi-
cation, on both sides of the internalism/externalism divide. On this score, epistemic internalists such as 
Conee and Feldman (2004) tell us that epistemic justification supervenes on mental states that are them-
selves regarded as underwritten by processes internal to the cognitive architecture of the biological agent. 
Epistemic externalists, despite offering a contrasting picture of epistemic justifiedness, tell a similar story 
as the epistemic internalist does, vis-à-vis the supervenience base of cognition; on the reliabilist program, 
for instance, epistemic justification is understood as entirely a matter of the reliability of belief-forming 
processes that occur squarely inside the agent’s bodily boundaries. For illustrative passages see Goldman 
(1979, 346–7; 1986, 51). Thus, both sides of this perennial first-order epistemological dispute persist with 
the traditional intracranial picture of cognition in the background.
4 This terminology owes to Clark and Chalmers (1998), who use the term “active” to distinguish this 
variety of externalism from the comparatively less radical content externalism. See Clark and Chalmers 
(1998); Clark (2008; 2008); Hutchins (1995); Menary (2006; 2007); Wheeler (2005); and Wilson (2000; 
2004) for some notable defenses of active externalist positions.
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Unlike “passive externalist” approaches such as content externalism (e.g., Putnam 1975; 
Burge 1986), according to which mental content is determined by one’s physical or 
social environment, active externalist views (e.g., the distributed cognition thesis,5 the 
extended mind thesis6 and the HEC) insist that the vehicles that run the content are 
constituted in part by elements of one’s physical environment, for instance, notebooks, 
smart phones and (in the case of distributed cognition) even other individuals.
The particular version of active externalism that has gained the most traction 
recently—and especially over the past five years or so7—is the HEC, according to which 
what is claimed to “extend” to include part of the world is cognitive processes.8 As 
Clark (2008, §2) puts it, from the perspective of HEC, “the actual local operations that 
realize certain forms of human cognizing include inextricable tangles of feedback, 
feed-forward and feed-around loops: loops that promiscuously criss-cross the bound-
aries of brain, body and world” (Clark 2008, §2).
To make this idea more concrete, consider Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) case of 
Otto:
Otto: Otto suffers from Alzheimer’s disease, and like many Alzheimer’s patients, he relies on 
information in the environment to help structure his life. Otto carries a notebook around with 
him everywhere he goes. When he learns new information, he writes it down. When he needs 
some old information, he looks it up. (Clark 2008, 8)
Is Otto’s notebook a part of his cognitive process? The proponent of HEC typically 
answers—by reference to common-sense functionalism—as follows: if the biological 
memory of an ordinary agent (in the default case) is part of her memorial process, 
then so does Otto’s notebook count as part of his. Of course, one might object: “but 
the notebook is neither biologically constituted, nor is it located intra-cranially!” But, 
as the line of thinking goes, this objection is not principled by the lights of common-sense 
functionalism, but just a revelation of “bioprejudice.”9
Clark and Chalmers (1998) accordingly propose, in order to cut off the stock rejoin-
der, what they call the parity principle—a principle that provides a very useful way of 
5 See, for example, Hutchins (1995); Huebner (2014); and Knorr-Cetnia (1999) for some representative 
examples.
6 The seminal case for this view, according to which, mental states can supervene on parts of one’s phys-
ical environment, is Clark and Chalmers (1998); though, note that Clark and Chalmers, also in their classic 
paper defending the extended mind, motivated the comparatively weaker extended cognition thesis.
7 See Carter et al. (2014).
8 Granted, many of the same reasons that would incline one to endorse extended cognition would lead 
one, mutatis mutandis, to endorse the claim distinctive of the extended mind thesis—viz., that mental states 
(e.g., beliefs) can supervene on elements of the world external to the agent. But the move from HEC to the 
extended mind thesis is, to stress, not one of entailment, and is in fact often resisted. This point is easily 
overlooked given that Clark (2008) himself opts to move interchangeably between discussions of extended 
mind and extended cognition in his published work. But this is only because Clark’s own preferred view 
of the nature of beliefs idiosyncratically identifies beliefs with processes as opposed to states. Against the 
background of a non-static view about beliefs, it is unsurprising that Clark is not interested in the differ-
ences between the views. Obviously, though, the received thinking about belief is as state—viz., as a 
propositional attitude—and this leaves open an endorsement of HEC without embracing the extended 
mind. Thanks to Andy Clark for clarificatory discussion on this point.
9 See Clark (2008, Ch. 1) for this terminology).
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thinking, free from any constitutional or locational prejudice, of what should 
be included in a description of cognition:
Parity Principle: If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, 
were it to go on in the head, we would have no hesitation in accepting as part of the cognitive 
process, then that part of the world is part of the cognitive process.
(Clark and Chalmers 1998, 8)
With reference to the parity principle, Otto’s notebook gets “ruled in” as part of his 
extended memorial process—a process through which his notebook is playing a role 
that is functionally isomorphic to the role played by biological memory (vis-à-vis 
storage and retrieval). And so, by HEC, the notebook is claimed to be a part of Otto’s 
extended memory.
1. The Objection from Cognitive Bloat
We’ll situate HEC within an epistemological setting shortly. But first, it’s important to 
take note of the most famous contemporary line of resistance to HEC—the argument 
from “cognitive bloat.”10 This is because, interestingly, the familiar patterns of the 
cognitive bloat objection to HEC share, as we’ll soon see, some striking commonalities 
with a strand of thinking found in the classic reliabilist literature in epistemology 
during the latter part of the twentieth century. And it will be with attention to some 
of these commonalities that the puzzle we’ll pose to the proponent of HEC gets off 
the ground.
First things first, though—critics of HEC are keen to compare the case of Otto 
 (originally used to motivate HEC) with cases such as the following:11
Telo: Telo has a normally functioning biological brain. Like Otto, but also like other individuals 
with properly functioning biological memory, he relies on information in the environment to 
help structure his life, and this includes the information in his Verizon phone book, which sits 
in his desk drawer by his telephone. When Telo needs to call someone, he looks up the number. 
For Telo, the phone book prevents him from having to memorise everyone’s phone number, 
just in order to make a call.
The worry looks straightforward enough: HEC is going to be implausibly inclusive 
(with respect to what counts as part of a cognitive process) if it turns out that Telo’s 
phonebook—which he consults only occasionally—gets ruled in as part of Telo’s 
memorial process: surely Telo’s memory cannot include the entire phonebook. To 
appreciate the force of the cognitive bloat, bear in mind (as further explained in Section 3, 
Cognitive Integration, pp. 48–50) that Telo’s memorial processes serve to underpin 
10 This general worry (expressed in terms of bloat by Rupert 2004) has been expressed alternatively as 
the coupling constitution fallacy (e.g., Adams and Aizawa 2008, 91). The common line is that HEC threatens 
to include too much of the world into cognition.
11 See, for instance, Rupert (2004).
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much of his knowledge. Surely, to ascribe knowledge to Telo of the entire phone book 
strikes one as implausible. And, mutatis mutandis, a range of similar examples can be 
posed to generate comparable consequences.12 “Telo-style” cases represent a familiar 
form of argument from slippery slope, and HEC thus needs a clear explanation for why 
we should treat Otto’s case differently from such ubiquitous cases.
Proponents of extended cognition are of course keenly aware of this strand of 
objection, and wish to endorse HEC in a way that respects plausible boundaries 
between what is internal and what is external to cognition in some constitutive 
sense.13 More precisely, the pressing challenge is to draw a principled distinction 
between genuine cognitive processes and background processes or auxiliary resources 
that causally influence cognitive processing without constituting parts of the cogni-
tive system.
Clark has attempted to meet this worry about demarcation by offering “integration 
conditions” that have become known as his “trust and glue” conditions for a non-
biological entity to count as included within a cognitive system. According to Clark 
(2008, 46) the central integration conditions that must be met are threefold:
Clark’s “Trust and Glue” Integration Conditions
 (1) “That the resource be reliably available and typically invoked.”
 (2) “That any information thus retrieved be more-or-less automatically endorsed. It should 
not usually be subject to critical scrutiny. [. . .] It should be deemed about as trustworthy as 
something retrieved clearly from biological memory.”
 (3) “That information contained in the resource should be easily accessible as and when 
required.”
While these three integration conditions do well enough to get easy cases right (e.g., 
cases where one consults, say, a map, but just on one occasion14), they are as Rupert 
(2004) has noted, perhaps still too inclusive: notice here that, even when we have 
moved beyond the parity of reasoning at play in the parity principle and spelled out 
integration conditions (1)–(3), it still seems like a case could be made for thinking that 
Telo’s phonebook might be ruled in.15
Effectively, then, what cases such as Telo highlight is the need to articulate some 
integration condition beyond (1)–(3), which would effectively (and in some principled 
way) rule Otto’s notebook in and rule Telo’s phonebook out. Unsurprisingly, one live 
12 See, for instance, Farkas (2016) for a case involving audiotapes of the complete history of Europe.
13 For a helpful discussion of this point, see also Spaulding (2012). See also Palermos (2011; 2014) for a 
response strategy that appeals to dynamical systems theory. Whereas Palermos (2011) viewed a kind of 
“continual reciprocal causation” condition as a suitable fourth condition, his more recent view (2014) is 
that the satisfaction of the CRC condition de facto satisfies Clark’s conditions (1–3).
14 Such a case would plausibly fail at least (1) and (3).
15 The sticking point is whether (3) is met in the case of Telo: given that Telo doesn’t carry his external 
device around with him at all times, perhaps that means it isn’t easily enough available as and when 
required. Be that as it may. The Telo case can surely be tweaked to satisfy condition (3). Thus, Rob Rupert 
(2004) has shown that cases like Telo can be made to fit Clark’s (1)–(3).
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research program in the literature on extended cognition is just how to spell out an 
additional condition to (1)–(3) that is neither too inclusive nor too exclusive.16
2. Extended Cognition and Epistemology
Let’s now transpose the foregoing into an epistemological setting. Memory is char-
acteristically regarded as a basic epistemic source—one that is widely thought to, in 
the absence of defeaters, support memory knowledge.17 To the extent that we are to 
take seriously what the proponent of HEC tells us—viz. that the extended process 
Otto enjoys is in fact one of extended memory—on a par in the relevant respects 
with biological memory—proponents of HEC must insist that Otto’s extended 
 process supports memory knowledge in a way that is relevantly analogous (and 
 certainly, not obviously disanalogous) to the way that biological memory supports 
memory knowledge in the default case. To the extent that HEC fails to preserve 
such an “epistemic parity” insight, we have reason to reject that what Otto exhibits 
is, in fact, extended memory.
A helpful way to think about this “epistemological parity” condition of epistemo-
logical adequacy for a proponent of HEC is in terms of the more basic parity principle 
we’ve already considered in Section 1, The Objection from Cognitive Bloat (pp. 44–6)—
that is, a proponent of HEC should be able to preserve that, ceteris paribus,18 for a sub-
ject S, and proposition p, if S comes to believe that p by a process which, were it to go on 
in the head, we would have no hesitation in ascribing knowledge that p to S, then S 
knows that p. In short, the Otto case had better be a case featuring memorial know-
ledge. And even more weakly: there had better not be any obvious impediments that 
constitute a barrier to Otto’s attainment of memorial knowledge. (And if there are, 
then HEC has a problem on its hands.)
At this point, some parallels between the HEC and epistemology will be revealing. 
In particular, it is interesting to note that a proponent of HEC who wants to vindicate 
knowledge through (what is, by HEC) an extended process—while at the same time 
steering clear of the cognitive bloat objection—runs up against a pattern of problems 
16 See here Pritchard (2010), Palermos (2011, 754–6), and Carter and Kallestrup (2016).
17 There is some dispute about how this works. According to generativism (e.g., Robert Audi (1995) and 
John Pollock (1986)) memorial knowledge is like perceptual knowledge in the sense that, just as perception 
generates positive epistemic status for one’s perceptual beliefs, so the phenomenology of recalling generates 
positive epistemic status for one’s memorial beliefs. By contrast, preservantists (e.g., Burge) draw a closer 
analogy between memory and testimony than between memory and perception. The preservantist line is 
that memorial serves the function of preserving the epistemic status of past beliefs, and so on this model, 
one’s knowledge is preserved through memory and remains known when recalled. See Carter and Pritchard 
(2015) for further discussion.
18 This is a simple statement of the epistemic parity principle. See Carter and Pritchard (2015) 
for  a  refinement, whereby the principle is framed in terms of defeasible warrant as opposed to 
knowledge.
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that share some obvious commonalities with a famous strand of thinking found in the 
classic literature on reliabilism in epistemology in the 1980s and 1990s.19
To appreciate this connection, take as a starting point Lehrer’s (1990) notorious 
“TrueTemp” case, in which Lehrer aimed at exploiting what are widely taken to be 
implausible implications of a flat-footed process-reliabilist line on which knowledge is 
true belief formed via a reliable belief-forming process.
Here’s a condensed version of Lehrer’s counterexample to simple reliabilism:
TrueTemp: TrueTemp has (though entirely unbeknownst to him) a temperature-detecting 
device implanted in his head that regularly produces accurate beliefs about the ambient 
temperature.20
As many commentators have accepted, the intuition is strong here that TrueTemp 
doesn’t attain knowledge in the above scenario, even though (thanks to the implanted 
thermometer) he reliably generates true temperature beliefs, which by the reliabilist’s 
lights is supposed to be all besides truth that matters. What accounts for this intuition 
to deny knowledge to TrueTemp, who we may grant reports with 100 percent accuracy?
A natural reaction will be to point out that the thermometer seems to function 
like an “external” device outwith Temp’s own cognitive architecture, which generates 
reliable information for which TrueTemp himself seems nothing more than a receiv-
ing parrot. Plausibly, and more carefully: for TrueTemp to attain knowledge, it seems 
the correctness of his beliefs must be down to his own efforts, as opposed to the pro-
duction of some technological implant. So, to be precise, the problem here is not that 
the generation of temperature beliefs by TrueTemp’s thermometer cannot count as 
an “extended” cognitive process, but rather that these beliefs fall short of knowledge 
on account of not being creditable to his own faculties. Hence, the problem is how this 
device can play a role in an “extended” process that yields knowledge for TrueTemp.
The foregoing line of thought has motivated some philosophers to embrace (along 
with a reliability condition on knowledge) something like an “ability” condition on 
knowledge:21
Ability condition: S knows that p only if S’s believing correctly that p is significantly creditable 
to S’s exercise of cognitive ability.22
19 One of the first cases of this sort was BonJour’s (1980) famous case of “Norman the Clairvoyant.”
20 This paraphrasing of the case is taken from Goldman (2016). See Pritchard (2010) for a discussion of 
integration conditions.
21 Of course, the point here is compatible with accepting that there can be other necessary conditions 
on knowledge that are not satisfied in cases like the TrueTemp case. The key point is that it’s plausible 
to think that a sufficient condition for denying knowledge in the TrueTemp case is that he fails an 
 ability condition.
22 It is important to bear in mind that an ability condition on knowledge is independently motivated by 
considerations about certain Gettier cases. For instance, in Chisholm’s case of the sheep in the field, the 
truth of your (justified) belief that there’s a sheep in the field is not primarily down to the exercise of your 
perceptual abilities. Rather, it is true because of some environmental happenstance, viz. that a sheep is 
hidden behind the disguised dog at which you are looking. True, a modal condition on knowledge to do 
with safety or sensitivity might equally well explain your lack of knowledge in this particular instance. But 
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With reference to the ability condition, there appears to be a straightforward explanation 
for what is lacking in the TrueTemp case—viz., although TrueTemp forms his belief 
via a reliable cognitive process, the process (in his case, where his belief is entirely down 
to the implanted thermometer of which he is unaware) is not part of his exercise of 
any cognitive ability he has. And, furthermore, the explanation for why it is not, is, as 
Greco (2010) has noted, plausibly because the thermometer is not appropriately 
integrated into TrueTemp’s cognitive agency.
3. Cognitive Integration
At this point, it should be clear how the notion of “cognitive integration” of interest to 
proponents of HEC who wish to avoid the cognitive bloat objection is one with some 
precedent in epistemological theory23—and just as in the case of extended cognition, 
the epistemological issue of accounting for just what it is in virtue of which some exter-
nal device should be regarded as incorporated into an agent’s own cognitive ability 
requires the specification of some integration conditions.
Question: why, exactly, is the temperature-detecting device not appropriately inte-
grated into TrueTemp’s cognitive agency? (Notice that the TrueTemp case seems to be 
one such that Clark’s integration conditions (1)–(3) are all satisfied.) In particular, we 
can certainly imagine that TrueTemp automatically endorses any information that his 
implanted device yields, such as that the temperature is now 28°C.
One obvious explanation for why the thermometer should not count as appropri-
ately integrated in TrueTemp’s cognitive agency (in such a way that the correctness 
of his success could be attributable to any ability of TrueTemp’s) is plausibly that the 
reliability of the implanted device itself has never been positively acknowledged by 
TrueTemp.24 After all, TrueTemp has no inkling as to what even produces his tempera-
ture beliefs (!), let alone his track record of success.25
now imagine instead a case where you form beliefs about the ambient temperature in a room on the basis 
of reading a faulty thermometer that randomly fluctuates between 15°C and 25°C. As it turns out, someone 
next door unwittingly changes the room temperature so as to perfectly match your actual and counterfac-
tual beliefs. Only your failure to satisfy an ability condition can explain why your true belief falls short of 
knowledge.
23 See here also Beebe (2004) for a discussion of cognitive integration conditions for new perceptual 
faculties.
24 Perhaps of course there are other explanations for TrueTemp’s lacking knowledge, and we are happy 
to grant this. The point is just that his failure to ever take a reflective stance on the reliability of this process 
suffices to prevent his cognitive success from being creditable to an ability of his in a way that would be 
required for knowledge.
25 Erik Olsson, a foremost contemporary reliabilist, thinks that such a tracking requirement is, as he 
puts it, “part of the cognitive environment in which reliabilist knowledge promotes stability of belief and 
thereby attains its full practical value. Hence, even if knowledge is best defined in an externalist manner, 
the full realization of its value requires the satisfaction of a modest internalist condition” (Olsson 2007, 352). 
We raise this point not to defend any particular form of reliabilism, per se. Rather, we want to be clear that 
a tracking requirement hardly runs against the spirit of reliabilism.
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By analogous reasoning, as Pritchard (2010, 144) observes, in order for—in the Clark/
Chalmers extended case—Otto’s process of consulting his notebook to be sufficient for 
generating knowledge, Otto’s notebook is going to have to be—and much as TrueTemp’s 
thermometer was not—recognized and not merely (as with TrueTemp) relied upon. 
Here’s Pritchard (2010, 145):
Imagine, for example, that Otto is simply fitted with a device which provides him with reliable 
information about his environment and he unquestioningly consults it when necessary while 
never questioning the source of this information or its epistemic pedigree . . . if Otto had no 
awareness at all of the source of the reliability of the belief forming process, nor that it was 
 reliable, then it is hard to see why we would now regard the true beliefs that he forms as a 
 consequence as knowledge.26
The foregoing suggests that the second of Clark’s three “glue and trust” conditions is 
simply too weak in merely requiring that “any information thus retrieved be more-
or-less automatically endorsed.” A proviso must be included to the effect that the part 
of the world, for it to be included as part of a cognitive process, must not only be 
endorsed in the weak sense where the deliverances of the process are automatically 
endorsed (e.g., a condition clearly satisfied by TrueTemp, vis-à-vis the deliverances of 
the thermometer), but also in a stronger sense, where the resource itself is (at some 
point) affirmed and endorsed as reliable.
Take a resource to be reliable just in case the process of utilizing that resource in 
forming or sustaining belief is reliable. Here’s then a more demanding fourth integra-
tion condition that delivers the desired result of ruling the thermometer out from 
TrueTemp’s cognitive architecture:
(4) That the reliability of the resource be endorsed.
Obviously, then (and crucially): if Otto has failed to endorse his notebook as reliable, 
then (in all relevant respects) he is no better a candidate for memorial knowledge than 
the hopeless TrueTemp vis-à-vis knowledge of the temperature. (And that’s of course 
bad news insofar as HEC is to preserve epistemic parity—that Otto is on an epistemic 
par with his knowing counterpart in the default biological case.)
Now, a prima facie worry that might be advanced at this point is that imposing (4) 
on any putative cognitive process is unduly strong. More precisely, the concern would 
be that (4), when added to the mix, would cleave a striking disanalogy—one that 
should be unpalatable for proponents of extended cognition—between biological 
memory cases and extended memory cases.
After all, in the case of innate biological memory we typically do not positively 
affirm its reliability before we rely on its deliverances for knowledge preservation.27 
26 Compare here with Beebe (2004, §7).
27 For instance, if Otto’s process is the functional analogue of a normally functioning biological memory, 
Otto must consciously endorse the reliability of his notebook, where such a requirement does not seem 
needed for an individual—call her “Inga”—whose biological memory is normally functioning. Inga isn’t 
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To put in place such a requirement, as this line of thinking insists, would most certainly 
divest young children and other sufficiently unsophisticated individuals of vast amounts 
of stored knowledge. Hence, we should impose no such requirement in the case of 
extended cognition—insofar as we are to maintain functional similarity; or so the 
thought might be.
One reply to this objection on behalf of the friend of extended cognition is to concede 
that one or more of (1)–(4) can be dropped in the case of non-extended cognition. 
Consider, after all, that these “rough-and-ready” criteria are explicitly designed by Clark 
to be “met by non-biological candidates for inclusion into an individual’s cognitive 
system” (2008, 46, our italics). The intention is thus not for (1)–(4) to constitute neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for any resource, internal or external, to constitute a part 
of a cognitive system. We could thus conceive of them as forming a cluster where a 
resource is cognitive just in case it meets enough of these criteria. What would count as 
enough can then vary from case to case depending on the empirical details, as brought 
to light by the relevant parts of cognitive science.28
An alternative approach is to simply drop (4) in those cases where the external 
resource replaces an innate feature of an individual that is characteristic of members 
of the population to which that individual belongs.29 The thought would be that when 
it comes to cognitive integration of some external resource, the more the resource 
functionally resembles an individual’s natural endowment in just that sense, the less 
need there is for endorsement of its presence or reliability. If for some natural features, 
(4) plays no (significant) role in cognitive integration then the same should hold for 
external resources that merely serve as hardware substitutes for those features.
We shall not here probe deeper into the problem that (4) raises for ordinary biological 
memory. For instance, one might think the replies we sketched out represent too much 
of a departure from the common-sense functionalist spirit of the case for the extended 
cognition hypothesis. For the record, we do not share that concern. In the remaining 
part of this chapter, we shall pursue a different tack. In our view, the chief problem 
raised by (4) is its affliction of a malignant type of epistemic circularity that arises 
before any issues about classifying external resources as cognitive; or so we shall argue 
in the next section.
prevented from knowing that the Museum of Modern Art is on 53rd Street when relying on her biological 
memory, just because she has never positively endorsed the reliability of her own biological memory.
28 One way to flesh out this idea more precisely is to adopt Lewis’s (1972) notion of a cluster of criteria 
(or “properties”) as a disjunction of conjunctions of most of the criteria. But one could also imagine 
cases where less than a majority of the criteria would suffice, say if perfect resemblance in one respect 
could outweigh dissimilarities in other respects.
29 It is important not to drop (4) unless the external resource replaces an organic feature that is both 
innate and typical of the population in question. Imagine a TrueTemp case where a genetic engineer 
had implanted a reliable temperature-detecting device from birth. In such a case, we would arguably 
invoke (4) once the individual was sufficiently mature before the thermometer could be considered 
part of TrueTemp’s cognitive machinery. The case fails to satisfy a phylogenetic constraint to the effect 
that the relevant implant roughly corresponds in function to what results from evolution in humans, 
e.g., organic memory, as we all know it.
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4. Epistemic Circularity
Suppose, as we recommend, that the proponent of extended cognition avail herself 
of the additional integration condition (4). To require that Otto also endorse the 
reliability of his notebook before it can be counted as part of a cognitive process that 
leads to memory-supported knowledge is not implausible. Such explicit affirmation of 
reliability may go beyond Clark and Chalmers’s original set-up of the Otto case, but 
nothing in the way the Otto case is described prevents us from refining the example 
so as to include this additional feature. Consequently, supplementing integration 
conditions (1)–(3) with (4) presents no insuperable difficulty vis-à-vis accounting 
for the kind of extended cognition that the Otto case exemplifies. Or so it would seem 
at first blush.
We shall now argue that once the friend of extended cognition grants that Otto’s 
notebook counts as integrated within his cognitive process only if he endorses the 
reliability of the notebook, a kind of “catch-22” materializes. To bring the catch-22 
into focus, consider first a variation on the original TrueTemp case:
TrueTemp*: TrueTemp* is just like TrueTemp except that TrueTemp* endorses the reliability of 
his thermometer. However, TrueTemp* endorses the reliability of his thermometer on the basis 
of reading a fortune cookie.
Given that the received verdict is that TrueTemp fails to know the deliverances of his 
thermometer, it is surely implausible to suppose that TrueTemp* does know what 
TrueTemp did not know, simply because TrueTemp* has affirmed, on the basis of a 
fortune cookie, that his thermometer is reliable. It should be very strange indeed to 
see how the move from the TrueTemp case to the TrueTemp* case is one where the 
epistemic status of the deliverances of the thermometer is enhanced at all.30
In general, moving from not believing a proposition p to believing p on some 
improper basis (i.e., for some bad reason) cannot strengthen one’s epistemic position. 
TrueTemp’s endorsement must thus itself pass a certain kind of epistemic scrutiny; 
and indeed, should he endorse his thermometer in an epistemically proper way, then 
surely we will be less inclined to claim that he fails to know.
What this reveals then is that the strong endorsement condition (4) that Otto must 
satisfy, as a necessary condition on his notebook constituting a part of his cognitive 
process, is not a condition satisfied by epistemically defective endorsement. As the 
TrueTemp* case shows, no such endorsement of the reliability of a process can serve to 
raise the epistemic status of its deliverances.
30 Indeed, if anything, there is some pressure to move in the other direction and to suggest that an 
endorsement on the basis of a very unreliable process renders the epistemic status of the deliverances of the 
process worse than were the reliability of the process not endorsed at all but just blindly trusted. At any 
rate, the crux of the point here is that when one endorses the reliability of a process, P, the epistemic 
status of the deliverances of P is not thereby enhanced in light of an endorsement of P by an unreliable or 
defective process.
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Now we can frame the catch-22: for Otto’s notebook to count as part of his cognitive 
process, Otto must not merely endorse the reliability of his notebook, but more spe-
cifically, he must do so in the right sort of way—viz., in a way where the endorsement 
in question is itself the product of reliable cognitive abilities. This suggests that (4) 
should be replaced with the more demanding (4*):
(4*) That the reliability of the resource be reliably endorsed.
Clearly, Otto’s endorsement of the reliability of his notebook via his failing biological 
memory is no better than if TrueTemp simply used an unreliable process to endorse 
the reliability of his thermometer. (After all, Otto’s failing biological memory is, given 
the effects of Alzheimer’s disease, highly unreliable.) But since the move from the 
TrueTemp case to the TrueTemp* case is not one where the epistemic status of the 
deliverances of the thermometer is enhanced, neither is it plausible to think that Otto 
should enhance in any way the epistemic status of the deliverances of his notebook 
simply by endorsing its reliability with an epistemically defective, failing biological 
memory. So, Otto fails to satisfy (4*) as long as his endorsement of the reliability of his 
notebook relies on his (failing) biological memory.31 Yet Otto must satisfy (4*) if he is 
to count as having knowledge based on an extended memorial process.
But there is an obvious alternative. While Otto’s failing biological memory is not a 
reliable process, his consulting of the notebook is! Thus, as the argument might go, 
Otto’s self-conscious endorsement of the reliability of the notebook must be not merely 
retained through biological memory32 (as this wouldn’t increase the epistemic status of 
the deliverances of his notebook), but rather, through the reliable extended process—
the process of writing down information in the notebook and consulting it later. 
So, perhaps Otto does satisfy (4*) as long as his endorsement of the reliability of his 
notebook is acknowledged via an extended process involving his notebook.
But now a different sort of problem looms. Were Otto to endorse the reliability of 
his notebook via the notebook, he would be endorsing the process of consulting the 
deliverances of the notebook as reliable by appealing to the deliverances of the notebook. 
But this strategy degenerates into a notorious kind of epistemic circularity. Compare: 
suppose you are reading a book about Rome, which includes claims A, B and C on 
31 Consider, further, that if Otto’s endorsement of the reliability of the notebook is not preserved via 
the notebook, but rather, preserved via biological memory, then the endorsement will be “fleeting” and 
unstable; this plausibly undermines the epistemic integrity of the endorsement. After all, for the endorsement 
to have the epistemic significance it needs to have in order to positively affect the epistemic status of the 
deliverances of the notebook, the endorsement must be in some way a stable one. Compare this suggestion 
with the implausible thought that the epistemic status of the deliverances of the notebook is enhanced, in 
perpetuity, in virtue of a fleeting assent that is forgotten and as such not preserved in memory while Otto 
continues to rely on the notebook.
32 It might also be argued that Otto can be deemed to reliably endorse the reliability of the notebook 
during a “moment of lucidity” with his biological memory, even if his failing biological memory is not in 
general reliable. However, it’s hard to see how much work this move could do, given that an endorsement 
in a moment of lucidity would be an unsafe method. (In very close nearby worlds, the endorsement at issue 
derives from a failing memory.)
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which you rely. You then notice a passage in the book saying that all the claims in 
the book, including the one you are reading right now, are reliable. Does this increase 
the epistemic standing of your beliefs in A, B and C? If you didn’t know A, B and C 
before, do you then know them now? It’s hard to see why. The upshot seems to be that 
(4*) should be replaced with the even more demanding (4**):
(4**) That the reliability of the resource be reliably and non-circularly endorsed.
Trouble is, Otto seems incapable of satisfying (4**). But then the extent of the problem 
comes to focus: in order to not drive an epistemic wedge between cases of extended 
memory and biological memory, where only the latter qualify as knowledge, it’s import-
ant to show how the Otto case does not leave the notebook looking like TrueTemp’s 
thermometer. We saw that what is needed here is that Otto satisfies condition (4), i.e., 
that he endorses the reliability of his notebook. However, we also noted that epistemic-
ally defective endorsement of the notebook will leave Otto no better than TrueTemp*, 
who endorses the reliability of his thermometer on an improper basis. What is needed 
then is condition (4*), i.e., that Otto endorses his notebook via a reliable process. That 
means Otto cannot endorse the reliability of his notebook on the basis of his failing 
biological memory. Instead Otto can satisfy condition (4*) by epistemically relying 
on the reliability of the notebook itself. Such an approach, however, seems doomed to 
fail on grounds of epistemic circularity. That is to say, while consulting the notebook is 
a reliable process, endorsing the process of consulting the deliverances of the notebook 
as reliable by appealing to the deliverances of the notebook betrays a kind of epistemic 
circularity. On the assumption that epistemic appeal to either Otto’s biological mem-
ory or extended memory exhausts the options, the unfortunate upshot is that the 
proponent of extended cognition has run into an intractable jam.
5. Potential Replies
In this final section, we shall discuss two possible responses to the catch-22 we have 
outlined. Basically, unless Otto reliably endorses the reliability of his notebook in a way 
that epistemically depends neither on his own biological memory nor on the note-
book itself, we won’t be able to rule Otto in while ruling TrueTemp and TrueTemp* out 
in a way that is epistemically non-circular. So, the pressing challenge for the extended 
cognition theorist is to explain how Otto could possibly satisfy (4**).
However, before we turn to those two responses, we should pause to deal with a 
concern about generality that may immediately spring to mind. The worry is that our 
catch-22 depends on the details of the Otto case in ways that don’t generalize to other 
cases of extended cognition. In particular, Otto’s biological memory is deficient, but 
this particular feature seems to play no role in other motivating cases such as Clark and 
Chalmers’s “Tetris” case.
In response, it’s correct that our catch-22 hangs on a particular feature of the Otto 
case in the sense that Otto cannot satisfy (4*) by relying on his failing biological 
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memory. The only other way for Otto to satisfy (4*) seems to involve appeal to the 
 reliability of his notebook, which then implies that his endorsement of its reliability is 
circular—in violation of (4**). At this juncture, we could distinguish between two 
types of cases of extended cognition: those where individuals incorporate an external 
device to compensate for a natural deficiency, and those where individuals incorpor-
ate an external device to improve their otherwise normal cognitive functioning. Our 
catch-22 would thus hold for all those not insignificant cases that belong to the for-
mer category. But, importantly, even those cases of extended cognition that belong to 
the latter category would be subject to (4**). That is to say, cases of extended cognition 
involving individuals with impeccable biological memory must still endorse the reli-
ability of the pertinent external resource in a way that is both reliable and non-circular. 
The same epistemic issues thus arise for both groups, i.e., that the endorsement be 
 neither epistemically defective nor epistemically circular. The only difference between 
individuals who suffer from such cognitive shortcomings and those who do not is 
that the former have fewer epistemic resources available to meet our additional inte-
gration conditions. The conditions themselves are in good standing regardless of 
any such shortcomings.
5.1 First response
One natural response to the dilemma we’ve sketched will be to argue that it is possible 
for Otto to endorse the reliability of his notebook without epistemically relying on his 
failing biological memory. However, if Otto’s epistemic resources are confined to his 
own cognitive and perceptual faculties, it is difficult to see how he might avoid doing 
so. Here is why. Observe first that the belief-sustaining process involving the notebook 
is at best conditionally reliable in that such a process includes other beliefs as inputs. 
We assume (in keeping with Clark and Chalmers’s text) that Otto will record only 
believed propositions in his notebook. In general, a process is conditionally reliable 
just in case it issues in mostly true beliefs when those input beliefs are true. An obvious 
way for him to determine whether the notebook is reliable in that sense is to see 
whether the notebook, when employed in belief-sustaining processes, leads to a high 
ratio of true beliefs given true beliefs as input.
Now consider a range of true propositions p1, p2, p3 . . . pn all of which Otto believes. 
Suppose at t1 Otto writes (a sentence expressing) p1 down in his notebook. Then at t2 he 
retrieves p1 from the notebook after which he endorses that proposition. In that case, 
the process involving his notebook of sustaining his belief has produced a true belief 
given a true belief as input. The notebook successfully sustains Otto’s dispositional 
belief in p1. Suppose that the same thing happens at t3 and t4 with p2. Again, the same 
process has sustained a true belief given as input a true belief. And so on until Otto 
gets to pn. There is thus no question that the process is reliable. The question is whether 
Otto is in a position to reliably affirm its reliability. Otto would be able to do so only if 
he can accurately compare notebook entries at t1, t3 . . . tn with what is recorded in the 
notebook at t2, t4 . . . tn+1. That way Otto could amass track-record evidence that the 
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notebook was correct on all these occasions from which he can inductively infer that 
the notebook is reliable. However, amassing such evidence requires of Otto that at 
t2, t4  . . . tn+1 he remembers his past notebook entries at t1, t3  . . . tn, and since Otto’s 
biological memory is fading, that is something he cannot do.33
Perhaps it is wrong to consider Otto in epistemic isolation. The proposal might be 
that if we extend Otto’s epistemic resources to include other testifying individuals, 
then perhaps it would be possible for Otto to endorse the reliability of his notebook 
without epistemically relying (in a way that is malignantly epistemically circular) on 
his failing biological memory. Assuming the reliability of these other individuals, 
they could perhaps make up for the epistemic shortfall posed by the detrimental effects 
that Otto’s Alzheimer’s has had on his biological memory. After all, we ordinarily rely on 
others for vast amounts of knowledge of the external world. The current thought is that 
we can successfully do so whether our memory has deteriorated or not, even in cases 
such as Otto and his notebook. Let’s probe into this proposal in more detail.
Suppose that Otto endorses the reliability of his notebook on the basis of some 
piece of reliable testimony. It is essential that the testimony be reliable. Otherwise, 
the problem about defective epistemic basing returns, as illustrated by TrueTemp*. 
Imagine that a trusted friend, whose memory is impeccable, comes to know inde-
pendently that Otto’s notebook is reliable. She reliably conveys that information to 
Otto who on that basis forms a belief in the reliability of the notebook. That would 
certainly suffice as an account of how Otto can reliably and non-circularly endorse 
the reliability of his notebook. So, it looks as if condition (4**) is, after all, satisfied.
Nevertheless, the extended cognition theorist is not home and dry yet. For one thing, 
consider that unless Otto records the information afforded by the reliable testimony in 
the notebook (or somewhere else), then the endorsement of the notebook’s reliability 
on the basis of reliable testimony will be a kind of “fleeting” endorsement that is soon 
after forgotten. And a fleeting endorsement is problematic for reasons already con-
sidered—viz., the epistemic integrity of an endorsement is undermined if endorsement 
is unstable. But, of course, Otto can stabilize his endorsement of the reliability of the 
notebook on the basis of reliable testimony by recording it in the notebook (or some-
where else). However, in doing so, Otto will be in a position where Otto’s having a 
 stable endorsement depends on his consulting the notebook to affirm that the notebook 
is reliable—and thus the circularity worry raises its head.
33 The notebook is obviously an overly simplified, toy example. For instance, Otto may be expected to 
have a large swathe of background information about notebooks, e.g., that any information got there by his 
writing it down, that any written information doesn’t move around on its own, which would help him 
establish the reliability of this particular notebook. Smartphones may be better candidates for cognitive 
extension, but few have any substantial background information about their inner workings. Could a high-
tech savvy version of Otto ascertain the reliability of such a technological device by directly inspecting its 
hardware and software features without having to gather track-record evidence? Given that he would have 
to rely on his already acquired knowledge of which such features could make his phone perform reliably, 
his fading memory would surely impair any such ability he might otherwise have had.
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But despite this issue, there’s another problem with the testimony strategy, which we 
can appreciate by revisiting the TrueTemp case, only this time with the same twist as in 
the Otto case. Imagine that TrueTemp forms a belief in the reliability of his temperature-
detecting device merely on the basis of a reliable piece of testimony. It is by no means 
obvious that TrueTemp’s reliable beliefs about the ambient temperature thereby 
constitute knowledge. Epistemological internalists insist that beliefs reliably produced 
(or sustained) by strange and fleeting processes are defeated on grounds of subjective 
irrationality.34 As BonJour (1985, 61) put it, “if the acceptance of a belief is seriously 
unreasonable or unwarranted from the believer’s own standpoint, then the mere fact 
that unbeknownst to the believer [it was reliably formed] will not suffice to render the 
belief epistemically justified.” The present point is that the reliability of TrueTemp’s 
belief in the reliability of his thermometer cannot offset subjective irrationality either. 
Given what else TrueTemp believes, he should have been suspicious of this testimony. 
After all, he lacks good reasons to think he possesses any temperature-detecting 
ability; indeed, he is aware of no other people possessing such seemingly spurious 
ability. What is needed is not another reliably produced belief, but accessible reasons, 
or awareness of evidence, which can render the process in question reasonable from 
TrueTemp’s point of view.
The foregoing has implications with respect to how we might amend condition 
(4**). If we are to exclude TrueTemp’s thermometer as a constitutive part of his cogni-
tive process, mere reliable (and non-circular) endorsement of the reliability of the 
resource will not suffice. We need a third constraint that its reliability be rationally 
endorsed, where rationality is understood in the subjective sense of being reasonable 
from an internal perspective:
(4***) That the reliability of the resource be reliably, non-circularly and rationally endorsed.
Bear in mind that endorsement is meant to be a necessary condition on cognitive inte-
gration of some resource into a cognitive system. If endorsing (the reliability of) some 
resource is irrational from the point of view of the individual, say if certain background 
beliefs conflict with the deliverances or putative reliability of that resource, then no 
endorsement can facilitate its integration into a cognitive system. As cognitive integra-
tion involves, among other things, explanatory coherence and inferential consistency, 
such irrationality is precluded between standing attitudes toward the resource and the 
cognitive system into which that resource is a candidate for integration.35
34 Even reliabilists admit that reliably produced (or sustained) beliefs are subject to various types of 
 epistemic defeat, including mental state defeaters. See for example Goldman’s (1986, 62–3, 111–12) non-
undermining condition. So, both epistemic internalists and epistemic externalists accept that subjective 
irrationality can defeat beliefs that are otherwise reliably produced.
35 One might worry that (4***) begs the question against the extended cognition theorist by requiring 
that the reliability of the resource be rationally endorsed in the sense of being subjectively reasonable. After 
all, the extended cognition thesis is a form of active externalism, whereas subjective rationality has typic-
ally been adopted by epistemic internalists as a constraint on epistemic justification. However, this worry 
is misconceived. First, we showed that subjective rationality is not a prerogative of epistemic internalists; 
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The foregoing yields the right results in the cases of TrueTemp and Otto. If 
TrueTemp’s endorsement of the (reliability of the) thermometer were not just reliable 
and non-circular, but also rational in the sense that he was internally aware of the fac-
tors that make his beliefs reliably produced, then he could take them into account 
when rationalizing his linguistic and physical behavior. For instance, that may involve 
abandoning other beliefs so as to restore internal consistency in his belief set. Such 
rationalization would thus help fully integrate his thermometer into his cognitive 
system. Assuming the absence of any (non-defeated) defeaters, the true beliefs that are 
formed on the basis of his thermometer would then count as knowledge. The same is 
true in the case of Otto. If his endorsement of (the reliability of) the notebook were not 
just reliable and non-circular, but also rational in the pertinent sense, then he could draw 
on the factors that make his notebook reliable when rationalizing his linguistic and 
physical behavior. Again, such rationalization would play a key role in the integration 
of the notebook into Otto’s cognitive system. Further, the true, reliable, and undefeated 
beliefs that are sustained by the notebook would then count as knowledge.
The important difference between TrueTemp and Otto is that only Otto suffers 
from a serious cognitive shortcoming. The question is whether Otto would be 
able to rationally endorse the reliability of his notebook given the suboptimal state 
of his memory. He would have to be internally aware of the factors that make his 
belief-sustaining process conditionally reliable, as well as be able to rationalize 
his behavior in various ways. Assuming that involves, among other things, revising 
existing beliefs, Otto would then have to draw extensively on his biological mem-
ory. Bear also in mind here that memory is a fundamental cognitive process which 
subserves most other cognitive functions. So, the prospects for producing an 
account of how Otto could rationally endorse the reliability of his notebook look 
dim; or so we contend.
5.2 Second response
The second response is to argue that the epistemic circularity that seems to afflict 
the process of endorsing the reliability of the notebook via its own deliverances is 
benign. Epistemic circularity is to be distinguished from logical circularity, where 
the conclusion of an argument features explicitly as one of its premises, and rule 
even paradigmatic epistemic externalists accept that lack of such rationality constitutes a type of epistemic 
defeat. Second, the charge of (4***) being question-begging is premised on the claim that epistemic inter-
nalism and HEC are incompatible. But this is false, unless one already assumes epistemic individualism, the 
thesis that what converts true belief to knowledge supervenes on properties of the biological agent. Once it is 
appreciated that epistemic internalism and HEC are incompatible only against a background of epistemic 
individualism—a thesis which has been shown problematic in its own right (cf. Goldberg 2014)—we 
can easily envision epistemic anti-individualist construals of both accessibilist (e.g., Chisholm 1977; and 
Bonjour 1985, Ch. 2) and mentalist (e.g., Conee and Feldman 2001) versions of epistemic internalism; 
see Carter and Palermos (2014) for a development of this argument, on which it is suggested that our 
pretheoretical intuitions regarding the incompatibility of active externalism with epistemic internalism are 
symptomatic of a tacit yet incorrect identification of epistemic internalism with epistemic individualism.
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circularity, where an epistemic rule is employed in an argument for the conclusion 
that the use of that rule is reliable.36 In contrast, epistemic circularity is typically 
formulated in terms of (knowing) a premise to rely on (the reliability of) a belief 
source in an argument with the conclusion that that source is reliable.37 But we can 
also formulate a notion of epistemic circularity of a process: a process of endorsing 
the reliability of some (internal or external) resource cannot rely on the deliver-
ances of that resource. So, in the case of Otto, what is the argument (or process) in 
question? We will consider two scenarios. First, imagine that when Otto first 
acquired the notebook it said in the preface, “This notebook is reliable.” It is hard to 
see how Otto could come to know (or even justifiably believe) that the notebook is 
reliable on the basis of reading that statement in the notebook, even if indeed that 
statement is true. Consider the following:
(1) The notebook says that it is reliable.
(2) So, the notebook is reliable.
Since having knowledge of (or a justified belief in) premise (1) relies on the reliability 
of the notebook in an argument with the conclusion that the notebook is reliable, the 
argument (1)–(2) is blatantly epistemically circular.
Consider instead the second scenario: Otto writes down the content p of a true 
belief at time t1, and then retrieves and endorses p at t2. Otto infers that his notebook 
accurately preserved a true content between t1 and t2. At t3 Otto writes down the 
 content q of a true belief, and then at t4 he retrieves and endorses q. Otto infers that 
the notebook accurately preserved another true content between t3 and t4. And so on. 
All these occasions of producing a true belief given a true belief as input constitute 
inductive evidence that the notebook is conditionally reliable. On that basis, Otto 
infers inductively that the notebook is conditionally reliable. Consider the following 
track-record argument:
(3) At t1 true (believed) content p was recorded in the notebook, and at t2 p was retrieved from 
the notebook and then endorsed.
(4) So, the notebook preserved a true (and dispositionally believed) content p between t1 and t2.
(5) Repeat with q at t2/t3, r at t4/t5 . . . n at tn/tn+1.
(6) The conjunction of the instances of true (and dispositionally believed) content preservation 
in (5) provides inductive evidence that the notebook is conditionally reliable.
(7) So, the notebook is conditionally reliable.
36 Note that, following Vogel (2008), our take on rule circularity makes it a property of arguments. 
We can also define a notion of rule circularity of belief: a belief that an epistemic rule is reliable cannot be 
justified by the application of that rule. See also Fumerton (1995, 180) who thinks we can never “use a kind 
of reasoning to justify the legitimacy of using that reasoning.”
37 For more on epistemic circularity, see for instance Alston (1986), Bergmann (2004), and Kallestrup 
(2012).
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The chief problem with this argument concerns the (deductively valid) step from (3) 
to (4).38 If the notebook were unreliable, Otto would not be justified in thinking the 
notebook had preserved a true content between t1 and t2. In that case, it would not be 
more likely than not that the content p, which was true when written in the notebook 
at t1, would also be true at t2. We standardly take justification to involve objective 
probability. This means that Otto is justified in believing (4) on the basis of (3) only if 
the notebook is reliable. But since that is exactly the conclusion (7) of the argument, it 
suffers from epistemic circularity.39
The question is now whether the extended cognition theorist might argue that the 
epistemic circularity, which the arguments (1)–(2) and (3)–(7) display, is somehow 
benign. Thus, Pryor (2004), Bergmann (2004), and Davies (2008) take the oddity of 
epistemically circular knowledge to stem from a lack of dialectical cogency of the 
afflicted arguments.
For instance, Bergmann maintains that such circularity is malignant only if these 
arguments occur in what he (2004, 719–20) coins “questioned contexts.” In such con-
texts a track-record argument is propounded with the purpose of settling the question 
of whether the conclusion is true, thus resolving any doubt about the conclusion. But 
since prior doubt about the conclusion undermines knowledge of those premises 
that are known only if that conclusion is true, a doubter cannot use that argument to 
rationally overcome her doubt. She is rationally obstructed from acquiring knowledge 
of the conclusion by going through that argument. Consequently, any attempt to use 
the argument to rationally convince such a doubter is question-begging. In contrast, 
track-record knowledge is innocent if the argument occurs in “unquestioned con-
texts” where the arguer has no initial reservations about the conclusion. In those 
contexts, the argumentative purpose is to make explicit the epistemic commitments 
of those who harbor no antecedent doubt about the conclusion.40
38 For a similar diagnosis of so-called bootstrapping arguments in general see Kallestrup (2012). Vogel 
(2008) thinks the bootstraps should be undone at the inductive step, in this case from (5)/(6) to (7), but 
there are several reasons why that’s too late. (i), While the track-record evidence in (5) may suffice for 
knowledge of (7), (4) counts as some justification for (7). (ii), (7) provides the best explanation of the 
truth of (5), indeed it is hard to see why (5) should be true unless (7) is also true. (iii), If Otto knows inde-
pendently that the notebook is either anti-reliable (always wrong) or else reliable, then he can deductively 
infer (7) from (4). S can thus bootstrap knowledge of (7) while bypassing the inductive step. For more 
details on (i)–(iii), see Cohen (2002), White (2006), and Titelbaum (2010), respectively.
39 A separate but related worry is that Otto’s failing biological memory prevents him from competently 
inferring (4) from (3). That is to say, to conclude that the notebook preserved a true content p between t1 
and t2, Otto would at the time of retrieval t2 need to recall what (if any) content was recorded at t1. One 
might try to finesse this point by suggesting that Otto at t1 also records the time at which he records p. Then 
at t2 if Otto cannot retrieve from biological memory the time (t1) at which he recorded p then presumably 
he can just consult the notebook! It should be clear by now why this proposal is problematic: it assumes 
that between t1 and t2 the notebook accurately preserved the time at which p was recorded, and so the 
question arises of how to justify that assumption in an epistemically non-circular way.
40 Others have argued that epistemic circularity is harmless if the pertinent method or process cannot 
possibly be justified in any non-circular way. For instance, Boghossian (2001) thinks that we are not unjus-
tified in reasoning through modus ponens just because we cannot provide a non-rule-circular justification 
for modus ponens. Since the circularity that features in the notebook case lacks this feature (e.g., Inga’s 
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The first remark to make is that even if this strategy were successful, the proponent 
of extended cognition would still need to provide an independent response to our first 
worry about rational endorsement. To adequately explain how Otto’s endorsement 
avoids being epistemically circular in any malignant sense is distinct from explaining 
how his endorsement is also subjectively rational. The second, and more important, 
observation is that this strategy looks unpromising in the case of Otto. The reason is 
that the arguments (1)–(2) and (3)–(7) are dialectically ineffective even for Otto who 
harbors no prior doubt about the conclusions (2)/(7). Assume momentarily that being 
in an unquestioned context comprises agnosticism in the sense of taking no attitude 
at all toward (2)/(7). Imagine that Otto is initially agnostic about (2)/(7), he knows the 
premises (1)/(3)–(6), acknowledges the validity of the argument, and on the basis of 
correctly inferring (2)/(7) from (1)/(3)–(6), he forms a belief in (2)/(7). Otto could not 
thereby come to know (2)/(7). The reason is that Otto’s agnosticism rationally prevents 
him from taking (1)/(3)–(6) to support (2)/(7). For if Otto did not already accept 
(2)/(7), he could not be justified in accepting (1)/(3)–(6). Hence, the arguments cannot 
be used by Otto to produce rational acceptance of (2)/(7) from a state of agnosticism 
about (1)/(3)–(6). Given that knowledge requires rational acceptance, the arguments 
cannot be used by Otto in a non-questioned context to acquire knowledge of (2)/(7).41 
The upshot is that our arguments are problematic even when they occur in an unques-
tioned context.
6. Concluding Remarks
We conclude by placing the result developed in this chapter into a wider perspective—
first by stressing what we do not take ourselves to have demonstrated, and then by 
highlighting why the foregoing problem outlined here is nonetheless a significant 
one. We have not argued that HEC is false, nor have we claimed that there is no way 
to “make room” for this thesis in epistemological theory. More would have to be shown 
to establish either of these claims.
Rather, we have raised a puzzle that cannot be brushed aside insofar as HEC is to 
hold water in epistemology; in doing so, we have highlighted as well a novel way that 
epistemic circularity threatens the possibility of knowledge stemming from extended 
cognitive processes.
Admittedly, we have focused on a single case in the development of our puzzle. Is 
this problematic? We think not. First, it should be evident from the discussion that the 
problem raised will apply mutatis mutandis to extended memory as a type of extended 
cognitive process. While Otto may be special in the way his memory is failing, the 
additional integration conditions we have argued for throughout do not hang on this 
biological memory could provide her with non-circular knowledge of Otto’s notebook), we shall hence-
forth set this approach aside.
41 Alston (1986) argues along similar lines, albeit not in the context of extended cognition.
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particular detail of the Otto case. If we are right then these conditions must be met 
in all cases of extended memory. Second, even if Otto’s case were relevantly different 
from other extended memory cases, it remains nonetheless that this case—famous 
now in the growing literature on extended cognition—is not merely an example, but 
the classic motivating example that is used to support HEC. In so far as the problem 
we sketch arises for Otto, then given that Otto’s case is widely understood as a para-
gon of extended memory, the epistemological puzzles that we have raised must be 
engaged head-on.
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